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Incentive Features in CEO 
Compensation in the 
Banking Industry
1. Introduction
he topic of corporate governance in general, and top-
management compensation in particular, has received 
enormous attention in recent years.1 Although an increasing 
literature has examined various aspects of the corporate 
governance of manufacturing firms in the United States and 
abroad, the corporate governance of banks and financial 
institutions has received relatively less focus.
Alignment of the incentives of top management with
the interests of shareholders has been characterized as an 
important mechanism of corporate governance.2  Managerial 
ownership of equity and options in the firm, as well as other 
incentive features in managers’ compensation structures (such 
as performance-related bonuses and performance-contingent 
promotions and dismissals), serves to align managerial 
incentives with shareholder interests. In fact, there is a large 
theoretical and empirical literature on the role of incentive 
contracts in ameliorating agency problems.3 The empirical 
literature has emphasized the role of the relationship between 
pay and performance, measured as the pay-performance 
sensitivity of managerial compensation structures. Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) document that the pay-performance sensitivity 
of large manufacturing firms is only $3.25 per $1,000 increase 
in shareholder value. Recent studies show that this sensitivity 
has increased over time, and most of it comes from option and 
stock holdings (see Murphy [1999]).4
It is important to understand corporate governance and the 
degree of managerial alignment in banks for several reasons. 
First, banks differ from manufacturing firms in several key 
respects. For one, banks are regulated to a higher degree than 
manufacturing firms. Do the regulatory mechanisms play a 
corporate governance role?5 For example, supervision that 
ensures that banks comply with regulatory requirements may 
play a general monitoring role. Does this monitoring substitute 
for or complement other mechanisms of corporate 
governance? In particular, does regulatory monitoring 
substitute for the need for incentive features in managerial 
compensation?6 By understanding the interaction of regulation 
and corporate governance, we can gain insight into the optimal 
design of regulation and corporate governance of banks.
An understanding of the incentive structure that motivates 
the key decision makers in banks can also be important in 
designing effective regulation. For example, if top management 
is very closely aligned with equity interests in banks, which are 
highly leveraged institutions, it will have strong incentives to 
undertake high-risk investments (risky loans, risky real estate 
investments), even when they are not positive net-present-
value investments.7 Regulatory oversight has to take such 
incentive distortions into account when regulatory procedures 
are established. John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) argue that 
regulation that takes into account the incentives of top 
management will be more effective than capital regulation in 
ameliorating risk-shifting incentives. They argue that pay-
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performance sensitivity of top-management compensation in 
banks may be a useful input in pricing Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance premiums and 
designing bank regulation.
Another important aspect that differentiates banks from 
manufacturing firms is the significantly higher leverage of 
banks. How does leverage interact with corporate governance 
and managerial alignment? In addition to conventional agency 
problems, these highly leveraged financial institutions are 
susceptible to the well-known risk-shifting agency problems. 
In these institutions, where depositors are the primary 
claimholders, the objective of corporate governance is not to 
align top management closely with the equity holders. Top 
management should also be given incentives to act on behalf of 
debtholders to an adequate degree. In such cases, providing 
managers with compensation structures that have low pay-
performance sensitivity may be optimal. John and John (1993) 
predict that managerial compensation in the banking industry 
should have low pay-performance sensitivity.
In this paper, we study the strength of incentive features 
in banks’ top-management compensation contracts. We 
examine the properties of bank-management compensation 
structures, including pay-performance sensitivity, using data 
from 1992 to 2000. Based on existing theory, we hypothesize 
that the pay-performance sensitivity of firms is decreasing in 
debt ratios and firm size; it should also be lower for regulated 
firms. We test these relationships for banks, manufacturing 
firms, and regulated utilities. Banks are regulated, highly 
leveraged, and, in our sample, larger than manufacturing 
firms. The hypothesized relationship implies that banks 
should have lower pay-performance sensitivity than 
manufacturing firms. The empirical evidence is consistent 
with these hypotheses.
The study by Barro and Barro (1990) is one of the early 
empirical papers on bank-management compensation. The 
authors find, among other things, that changes in CEO 
compensation depend on performance, as measured by stock 
returns and changes in earning yields. Houston and James 
(1995) document that, on average, bank CEOs receive less cash 
compensation, are less likely to participate in stock option 
plans, hold fewer stock options, and receive a smaller 
percentage of their total compensation in the form of options 
and stocks than do CEOs in other industries. Ang, Lauterbach, 
and Schreiber (2000) study the compensation structures of 
top-management teams in 166 U.S. banks from 1993 to 1996. 
They document that the compensation structures of CEOs are 
different from those of other top managers: CEOs are paid 
more and the incentive features in their compensation 
structures are significantly higher.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explore 
some insights from existing theories on managerial 
compensation structures in general to understand CEO 
compensation in banks. Section 3 describes the data and 
summary statistics. Section 4 presents empirical results on pay-
performance sensitivity in banks. In Section 5, tests of the 
hypotheses described in Section 2 are presented, and banks’ 
pay-performance sensitivity is compared with that of 
manufacturing firms.
2. Testable Hypotheses
Our strategy here is to relate pay-performance sensitivity of 
firms in general to their characteristics, and make these 
relationships the basis for understanding pay-performance 
sensitivity in banks. In particular, we formulate hypotheses 
comparing pay-performance sensitivity in banks with 
sensitivity in manufacturing firms.
The theoretical literature hypothesizes that the pay-
performance sensitivity of CEO compensation should be a 
function of the capital structure of the firm, firm size, and firm 
risk. John and John (1993) argue that a firm’s debt ratio should 
be a determinant of the degree of incentive features to be 
included in its top-management compensation contracts. 
When risky debt is outstanding, a CEO who is closely aligned 
with the firm’s shareholders will have incentives to risk-shift on 
behalf of equity holders. In other words, higher pay-
performance sensitivity in management compensation 
aggravates the well-known risk-shifting incentives associated 
with risky debt. Managerial compensation with low pay-
performance sensitivity can serve as a commitment device to 
minimize the agency costs of debt. The optimal managerial 
compensation structure in highly leveraged firms is shown to 
have low pay-performance sensitivity to restrain risk-shifting 
incentives on the part of the managers. This theory predicts 
that the pay-performance sensitivity in an optimally designed 
compensation structure will be declining in the debt ratio of 
the firm. Moreover, as banks have significantly higher debt 
ratios than the average manufacturing firm, pay-performance 
sensitivity in banks should be lower than it is in manufacturing 
firms. John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) extend this argument 
to propose that bank regulation and pricing of FDIC insurance 
premiums should incorporate the observable incentive features 
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These arguments give rise to the following testable 
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The pay-performance sensitivity of a firm 
should be a decreasing function of its debt ratio.
Hypothesis 2: Given their high debt ratios, banks should 
have a lower pay-performance sensitivity than 
manufacturing firms.
Researchers have also argued that pay-performance 
sensitivity should be inversely related to firm size and firm risk. 
For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that political 
influence might lead to smaller pay-performance sensitivity in 
large firms. Schaefer (1998) presents a model and offers 
empirical evidence that pay-performance sensitivity declines 
with firm size. The commercial banks in our sample are, on 
average, larger than the manufacturing firms, implying lower 
pay-performance sensitivity for banks. Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1987) show that the optimal performance-related 
compensation component (pay-performance sensitivity) for 
risk-averse managers should be inversely related to firm risk. 
In this argument, however, an implicit assumption is that the 
effectiveness of a manager’s effort is independent of firm risk. 
If managerial effort is more effective in riskier firms, then the 
above result may be overturned and a negative relationship 
between pay-performance sensitivity and firm risk may not 
obtain.
In addition, the pay-performance sensitivity of the 
compensation structure in banks could be lower than it is in 
manufacturing firms because banks are regulated institutions, 
and regulation could be a substitute for monitoring and 
incentivizing managers (for example, see Hirschey and Pappas 
[1981] and Carroll and Ciscel [1982]). Chidambaran and John 
(2000) argue that pay-performance sensitivity in opaque firms 
should be larger than it is in transparent ones. In transparent 
firms, monitoring is cost effective, while in opaque firms, 
monitoring is prohibitively costly and it is more effective to rely 
on the alignment of managerial incentives through high pay-
performance sensitivity. One can argue that many aspects of 
the business of banks are more transparent than those of many 
manufacturing firms, say, high-tech firms. Large banks are 
typically followed by a large number of analysts, which may 
also give rise to a relatively higher degree of transparency, 
implying lower pay-performance sensitivity in banks.8
These arguments give rise to the following additional 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Pay-performance sensitivity should be 
declining in firm size.
Hypothesis 4: Pay-performance sensitivity should be 
declining in firm risk.
Hypothesis 5: Pay-performance sensitivity in regulated firms 
should be lower.
In the next three sections, we test these hypotheses.
3. Data and Summary Statistics
We obtain compensation data for bank CEOs from Standard 
and Poor’s ExecuComp database. We start with a sample of 
623 CEO-years from 1992 to 2000 for 120 commercial banks 
(firms with Standard Industrial Classification, or SIC, codes 
6021 to 6029).9  Five observations are then removed from the 
sample because the data indicate that the CEO became chief 
executive officer after the end of the fiscal year. Stock returns 
and market values of common equity are obtained from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices. These two data sources 
are matched on a fiscal-year basis. If a stock is traded on fewer 
than 200 days during a year, that firm-year is excluded from the 
sample. The final sample thus contains 607 CEO-years. To 
remove the effect of inflation and to make our figures 
comparable, we convert all dollar-valued data into constant-
year 2000 dollars. The consumer price index used for this 
purpose is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
We study two measures of CEO compensation (see exhibit). 
The first measure, referred to as direct compensation and 
denoted as W1, is the sum of salary, bonus, other cash 
compensation, option grants, and grants of restricted stock. 
The second is a broad measure of the CEO’s changes in wealth 
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as firm-related wealth change and denoted as W2. It is the sum 
of salary, bonus, other cash compensation, change in value of 
option holdings, change in value of restricted stocks, profits 
from exercising options, and change in value of direct equity 
holdings.
Two issues merit further discussion. First, we use the value 
change of in-the-money options to approximate the value 
change of total option holdings. We do so because the value of 
the existing options is reported only for those options that are 
currently in the money.10
Second, we include the value change of direct equity 
holdings in the second measure of compensation. There are 
debates in the literature over whether to include this 
component as part of compensation. Some researchers argue 
that it should not be included because equity holdings can be 
viewed as an investment decision. However, there are restric-
tions on insider stock sales. In addition, insider sales are costly 
because of the negative market reaction. Moreover, regardless 
of its name, the value change of direct equity holdings will 
certainly affect the CEO’s wealth and hence his incentives. 
Therefore, we include it in our most comprehensive measure 
of compensation: the CEO’s firm-related wealth change.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for bank CEO 
compensation data. The median values of salary, bonus, new 
grants of options, and value change of option holdings are of 
the same order of magnitude, at around $500,000 to $600,000. 
However, the mean values of option grants and value change 
in option holdings are much larger—$1.2 million and 
$3.2 million, respectively. It is evident that the value change of 
direct equity holdings also constitutes an important factor in a 
CEO’s wealth change, with a mean value of $20 million and a 
median value of $6 million.
To determine if the compensation pattern changes over the 
years, we present the distribution of direct compensation 
between 1992 and 2000 (see chart). The chart’s left axis 
indicates compensation in thousands of dollars; the line 
corresponds to the right axis and shows the average annual 
stock return for each year. Three findings are worth noting. 
First, total direct compensation is increasing over the years: in 
1992, average direct compensation was $3 million; that amount 
more than doubled by 1999. Second, option grants have been 
increasing significantly over the 1990s while the level of salary 
has changed very little. In fact, the percentage of option grants 
in direct compensation has increased from 20 percent in 1992 
to 54 percent in 2000. Third, both the increase in total direct 
compensation and the increase in option grants have little 
covariance with stock performance. If anything, it appears that 
bank CEOs receive an increase in option grants (relative to the 
previous year) when stock returns are low. In 1999, the chief 
executives received the highest dollar value of option grants, 
even though the average stock return was the lowest over the 
sample period.
4. Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
of Banks
In this section, we examine the pay-performance sensitivity of 
CEO compensation structures in banks. As is standard 
practice, we define pay-performance sensitivity as the dollar 
increase in CEO compensation for each $1,000 increase in 
shareholder value. To estimate this measure, we run the 
following regression:
(1) (CEO compensation)it = a + b * ∆ (shareholder value)it + uit + ε it,
where (CEO compensation)it denotes CEO compensation for 
bank i in year t; ∆ (shareholder value)it denotes the shareholder 
value change for bank i in year t and is measured as the market 
value of the bank at the end of year (t-1) multiplied by the stock 
return in year t; uit is the CEO fixed effect; and ε it is the error 
term. As discussed in Section 3, we use two measures of CEO 
compensation: direct compensation (W1) and firm-related 
wealth change (W2).
Table 1




Other cash compensation 283 4
Option grants 1,721 614
Grants of restricted stocks 577 0
    Direct compensation 4,221 2,274
Value change of option holdings 3,198 626
Profits from exercising options 1,184 94
Value change of restricted stocks 500 0
Equity holdings (percent) 1.38 0.25
Value change of equity holdings 15,515 2,812
    Firm-related wealth change 20,168 5,996
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for different compensation 
components for 607 bank CEO-years over the 1992-2000 sample period. 
The sample banks are large, with a median market value of $3.4 billion, 
and the largest one has a market value of more than $109 billion. The 
banks performed well during the sample period, with a median annual 
stock return of 21 percent. Except where noted, figures are in thousands 
of dollars, adjusted to constant-year 2000 dollars.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2003 113
Compensation
Distribution of Direct Compensation by Year
Notes: The left axis corresponds to compensation data and is reported in thousands of constant-year 2000 dollars. The histograms depict the mean 




























The pay-performance sensitivities corresponding to the two 
measures of compensation are presented in Table 2, panel A. 
The sensitivity for direct compensation (W1) is -0.24, which is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This means that 
for every $1,000 decrease in shareholder value, the bank CEO 
receives 24 cents more in direct compensation. The sensitivity 
for the broader measure of compensation, that is, firm-related 
wealth change (W2), is 4.70, which is also statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. This means that for every 
$1,000 increase in shareholder value, the bank CEO receives 
$4.69 more in all of his firm-related wealth.
As expected, the pay-performance sensitivity of the second 
measure of compensation is higher. One source of this 
difference in sensitivity is the inclusion of CEO stock holdings 
in the second measure. The median stock holdings by bank 
CEOs are 0.25 percent. A stock ownership of 0.25 percent by a 
CEO would increase the pay-performance sensitivity by $2.5 
per $1,000 increase in shareholder value. A second source of the 
higher value of pay-performance sensitivity for W2 is the 
inclusion of changes in the value of existing option holdings. As 
noted by Hall and Liebman (1998), changes in option value are 
an important factor contributing to high pay-performance 
sensitivity.
The negative value of the pay-performance sensitivity for 
W1 deserves some explanation. The negative coefficient of 
-0.24 implies that CEOs receive an increase of 24 cents in direct 
compensation for every $1,000 decrease in shareholder value. 
By examining the chart, one may see a potential explanation for 
this estimate. In 1999, the average firm performance of the 
banking industry was the lowest over the sample period; 
however, the direct compensation to CEOs was the highest. 
In particular, option grants and grants of restricted stocks to 
Table 2








Panel A: Entire sample period





Number of observations 605 439
Panel B: Excluding 1999





Number of observations 532 375
Notes: The table presents the regression results of equation 1. The sample 
includes 607 bank CEO-years from 1992 to 2000. Column 1 displays the 
results with direct compensation as the dependent variable; in column 2, 
firm-related wealth change is the dependent variable. t-statistics are in 
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CEOs were at their highest levels. These observations suggest a 
preponderance of executive stock option resettings in 1999. 
Resetting or repricing executive stock options refers to the 
common practice of lowering the exercise price of the options 
when the stock price has undergone a large decline.11 This 
practice increases the value of the stock option to the CEO, 
offsetting its value decline caused by the stock price decline. 
It therefore leads to a sharp decrease in pay-performance 
sensitivity. Widespread resetting of stock options during a 
period of declining stock price has the potential to give rise to a 
negative coefficient of pay-performance sensitivity.
To see whether 1999 was an outlier year in this regard, we 
reestimate the coefficient of pay-performance sensitivity 
excluding that year (Table 2, panel B). As we expect, the 
sensitivity of the direct compensation measure increases: the 
coefficient rises from -0.24 to 0.40. Similarly, the pay-
performance sensitivity of the firm-related wealth change 
increases from 4.70 to 7.53. These results are consistent with 
our argument that 1999 was an outlier year with a high 
frequency of stock option resetting. 
5. Banks Versus Manufacturing 
Firms
In this section, we compare the pay-performance sensitiv-
ity of CEO compensation structures in banks with that of 
manufacturing firms. We also examine the possible sources of 
differences in pay-performance sensitivity between the two 
groups. 
Based on the selection procedures described in Section 2, we 
obtain a sample of 5,659 CEO-years from 1992 to 2000 for 997 
manufacturing firms (defined as firms with SIC codes 2000 to 
3999).
Table 3 presents the pay-performance sensitivity of 
manufacturing firms for both measures of compensation. 
Panel A displays the regression results for the entire sample 
period; panel B excludes 1999. All pay-performance sensitivity 
coefficients are positive and highly significant. By comparing 
the two panels, we observe that both measures of sensitivity are 
higher when we exclude 1999. (A possible reason for the low 
sensitivity in 1999 has already been discussed in the context of 
banks.)
For firm-related wealth change, pay-performance sensitivity 
in manufacturing firms is higher than it is in banks, with or 
without the inclusion of 1999. However, for direct 
compensation, sensitivity in manufacturing firms is higher 
than it is in banks when 1999 is included, but lower when 1999 
is excluded.
To see whether or not these differences in pay-performance 
sensitivity are statistically significant, we run a pooled 
regression with a bank dummy:
(2) (CEO compensation)it = a + b1 * ∆ (shareholder value)it
      + b2 *Dbank* ∆ (shareholder value)it + uit + ε it ,
where Dbank  is the dummy for banks, which equals 1 if the firm 
is a bank and 0 otherwise, and other variables are defined as 
before. The coefficient b1 is the pay-performance sensitivity of 
manufacturing firms and (b1+b2) is the sensitivity of banks. If 
the pay-performance sensitivity of banks is lower than that of 
manufacturing firms, that is, if hypothesis 2 holds, then b2 
should be negative and significant.
The results for the pooled regressions under both measures 
of compensation appear in Table 4. Panel A provides the 
regression results for the entire sample period. The coefficient 
b2 is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
for both measures of compensation. For direct compensation, 
pay-performance sensitivity in banks is 0.4 lower than it is in 
manufacturing firms.  For firm-related wealth change, the 
sensitivity in banks is lower by $12.81 per $1,000 in shareholder 
value change. Panel B presents the regression results excluding 
Table 3








Panel A: Entire sample period





Number of observations 5,584 4,023
Panel B: Excluding 1999





Number of observations 4,831 3,436
Notes: The table presents the regression results of equation 1. The sample 
includes 5,659 CEO-years of manufacturing firms from 1992 to 2000. 
Column 1 displays the results with direct compensation as the dependent 
variable; in column 2, firm-related wealth change is the dependent 
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1999. As before, the pay-performance sensitivity for W2 is 
significantly lower in banks: the difference is $20.77 per $1,000 
of shareholder value change. The sensitivity for W1 in
banks is not significantly different from the sensitivity in 
manufacturing firms. Overall, we find that the sensitivity is 
lower than it is in manufacturing firms, consistent with 
hypothesis 2.
Table 5 compares selected firm characteristics and 
compensation structures of banks and manufacturing firms. 
As we see, on average, the banks in our sample are larger: the 
average bank has a market capitalization of $8 billion while the 
average manufacturing firm’s market capitalization is 
$5.8 billion. In addition, banks have significantly higher 
leverage than manufacturing firms: a debt ratio of 
83.17 percent versus 32.63 percent. These univariate 
comparisons of size and leverage are consistent with banks’ 
lower pay-performance sensitivity.
To test the determinants of the pay-performance sensitivity 
of banks relative to manufacturing firms more formally, we 
estimate the following regression:
(3) (CEO compensation)it = (b1 + b2 * size + b3 * risk + b4 
       * debt ratio + b5 * Dbank) * ∆ (shareholder value)it + b6 
        * size + b7 * risk + b8 * debt ratio + uit + ε it ,
where size is measured by the firm’s market value of equity, and 
risk is measured by the variance of the equity value changes, 
that is, the square of market value of equity multiplied by stock 
return volatility over the year. In the above specification, a 
negative b2 implies that pay-performance sensitivity decreases 
with firm size; a negative b3 implies that the sensitivity 
decreases with firm risk, and so on.
Results of the multiple regressions for both measures of 
compensation are presented in Table 6. For both measures, 
pay-performance sensitivity decreases in the debt ratio with a 
significantly negative coefficient b4. This result also holds when 
we exclude 1999. It is consistent with hypothesis 1, which 
predicts a negative relationship between pay-performance 
sensitivity and leverage. This is a central result that seems to be 
at the core of explaining the difference in pay-performance 
sensitivity between banks and manufacturing firms. As 
demonstrated in Table 5, one of the most significant 
differences between banks and manufacturing firms is leverage: 
significantly higher leverage seems to be the driving factor that 
determines lower pay-performance sensitivity.
A second important determinant of pay-performance 
sensitivity is firm size. For both measures of compensation, the 
coefficient b2 is negative, although it is significant only for W2. 
This result is consistent with hypothesis 3. The inverse 
relationship between firm size and pay-performance sensitivity 
also has the potential to explain banks’ lower pay-performance 
sensitivity. As is evident from Table 5, banks in our sample are 
significantly larger than manufacturing firms. Correspond-
ingly, the pay-performance sensitivity is significantly lower.
To check whether regulation also plays a role in lowering the 
pay-performance sensitivity of banks, we ran a regression with 
a sample consisting of banks, manufacturing firms, and 
utilities, which are also regulated. In the regression, we added a 
dummy for regulated firms (banks and utilities) and estimated 
the coefficient on the cross term of the regulation dummy and 
the change in shareholder value. We found that the coefficient 
is negative for both measures of compensation, but 
insignificant. 
Table 4
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Dbank * change in 






Number of observations 6,189 4,462
Panel B: Excluding 1999




Bank dummy* change in






Number of observations 5,363 3,811
Notes: The table presents the regression results of equation 2. The sample 
includes 6,266 CEO-years for banks and manufacturing firms from 1992 
to 2000. Column 1 displays the results with direct compensation as the 
dependent variable; in column 2, firm-related wealth change is the 
dependent variable. Dbank equals 1 if the firm is a bank and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5










Panel A: Firm characteristics
Size 8,023 5,848 2,174 3.76
Risk 112,617 273,256 -147,000 -2.50
Capital ratio (percent) 17 67 -51 -121.13
Debt ratio (percent) 83 33 51 121.13
Panel B: Compensation features
Salary 664 568 96 9.03
Bonus 972 584 388 6.87
Other cash compensation 283 211 77 2.04
Option grants 1,721 1,894 -173 -0.84
Restricted stock grants 577 222 355 3.6
Direct compensation 4,221 3,483 738 2.54
Value change of option holdings 3,198 3,338 -140 -0.17
Profits from exercising options 1,184 1,640 -456 -2.68
Value change of restricted stocks 500 11 489 2.01
Equity holdings (percent) 1.38 3.04 -1.66 -8.61
Value change of equity holdings 15,515 15,573 -58 -0.01
Value change of option holdings 20,168 19,172 996 0.16
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for firm characteristics and compensation for banks and manufacturing firms over the 1992-2000 sample 
period. The sample of banks includes 607 bank CEO-years; the sample of manufacturing firms includes 5,659 CEO-years. Column 1 displays the mean 
values for banks; column 2 displays them for manufacturing firms. Column 3 presents the difference between columns 1 and 2. Column 4 provides 
t-statistics for the difference between banks and manufacturing firms. Firm size is measured as a firm’s market value of equity and is reported in millions of 
constant-year 2000 dollars. Risk is measured as the square of market value of equity times stock return volatility over a fiscal year. All compensation data 
except for percentages are in thousands of constant-year 2000 dollars.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2003 117
6. Conclusion
This paper has examined CEO pay-performance sensitivity in 
the banking industry using 1992-2000 data. We find a pay-
performance sensitivity in banks of $4.7 per $1,000 increase in 
shareholder value for the broader incentive-related measure of 
compensation; most of the sensitivity can be attributed to 
option and stock holdings. This result can be compared with 
the pay-performance sensitivity in general of $6 per $1,000 
increase in shareholder value in 1996 (see Murphy [1999]). The 
evidence that pay-performance sensitivity in the banking 
industry, with its high leverage, is lower than it is in the 
manufacturing industry is consistent with our earlier 
hypothesis 2, which we formulated based on existing theory.
Also based on existing theory, we hypothesize that the pay-
performance sensitivity in firms should decrease in the debt 
ratio (hypothesis 1) and in firm size (hypothesis 3); it should 
also be lower for regulated firms (hypothesis 5). Banks are 
regulated, highly leveraged, and, in our sample, larger than 
manufacturing firms. The hypothesized relationship implies 
that banks should have lower pay-performance sensitivity than 
manufacturing firms. We also test these relationships for 
banks, manufacturing firms, and regulated utilities, and we 
document that the pay-performance sensitivity of firms 
decreases with debt ratio and size (consistent with hypotheses 1 
and 3). Banks have much higher leverage than manufacturing 
firms (debt ratios of 83 percent versus 33 percent), and, 
consistent with our hypothesis 2, their pay-performance 
sensitivity is significantly lower. In our sample, banks are also 
considerably larger ($8 billion average market capitalization 
versus $5.8 billion), which also implies lower pay-performance 
sensitivity in banks. The empirical evidence is consistent with 
these hypotheses. 
Optimally designed managerial compensation structures 
not only align CEO interests with those of shareholders, but 
also signal to other stakeholders the incentive structures 
underlying the risk choices being made by top management. 
Commercial banks are unique in that depositors are the most 
important class of claimholders; how risky depositors perceive 
their debt to be will determine how costly the banks’ capital will 
be.12 Hence, optimal management compensation in banks that 
takes into account both of these roles will have a pay-
performance sensitivity that is lower than it is for firms in 
general. 
An understanding of the nature of the compensation 
structure that motivates banks’ key decision makers can be an 
important tool when designing effective regulation. For 
example, if top management is very closely aligned with equity 
Table 6










































Number of observations 6,175 4,455


































Number of observations 5,351 3,805
Notes: The table presents the regression results of equation 3. The sample 
includes 6,266 CEO-years for banks and manufacturing firms from 1992 
to 2000. Column 1 presents the results with direct compensation as the 
dependent variable; in column 2, firm-related wealth change is the 
dependent variable.  (shareholder value) is the change in shareholder 
value. Firm size is measured as a firm’s market value of equity and is 
reported in millions of constant-year 2000 dollars. Risk is measured as 
the square of market value of equity times stock return volatility over a 
fiscal year. Debt ratio is measured as 1 minus the market value of 
common equity divided by the market value of assets, which in turn is 
equal to the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity 
plus the market value of equity. Dbank equals 1 if the firm is a bank and
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interests in banks, which are highly leveraged institutions, 
management will have strong incentives to undertake high-risk 
investments. Regulatory oversight has to take such incentive 
distortions into account when regulatory procedures are 
established. John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) argue that 
regulation that accounts for the incentives of top management 
will be more effective than capital regulation in ameliorating 
risk-shifting incentives. The authors contend that the pay-
performance sensitivity of top-management compensation in 
banks may be a useful input in pricing FDIC insurance 
premiums and establishing regulatory procedures in the 
banking industry.Endnotes
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1. For example, see recent surveys by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), John 
and Senbet (1998), and Bradley et al. (1999).
2. For example, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997), John and Kedia 
(2000), and Murphy (1999). John and Kedia (2000) study the role of 
managerial alignment in an optimally designed corporate governance 
system in the presence of other mechanisms of governance such as 
takeovers, monitored debt, and monitoring by large outside 
shareholders.
3. See Murphy (1999) and Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) for recent 
surveys of this extensive literature. 
4. Yermack (1995) measures the incentives related to stock options via 
a Black and Scholes (1972) approach. Hall and Liebman (1998) 
contribute to the literature by adding the value change of past granted 
stock options as a component of the pay-performance relationship. 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) test how the risk of firms affects pay-
performance sensitivity and find that high-risk firms offer low-
powered compensation.
5. See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998) for a 
discussion of the role of the legal mechanism in corporate governance. 
6. Chidambaran and John (2000) show that large shareholder 
monitoring and pay-performance sensitivity in managerial contracts 
will be complementary, and Hartzell and Starks (2000) provide 
supporting empirical evidence. John and Kedia (2000) show that, in 
an optimally designed governance system, monitored debt and 
managerial stock ownership will be complementary, while takeovers 
and managerial ownership will be substitutes. 
7. The risk-shifting incentives of equity-aligned management in 
leveraged firms are well-known; see, for example, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and John and John (1993).
8. Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (1998) document that stock 
analysts have less disagreement about forecasts of future earnings of 
bank holding companies relative to forecasts of earnings of 
nonfinancial firms of similar size. Morgan (2002), however, focuses 
on bond analysts and documents larger dispersion for banks relative 
to nonfinancial firms. A few studies document a much smaller stock 
market reaction to corporate events for bank holding companies 
relative to manufacturing firms. For example, Cornett, Mehran, and 
Tehranian (1998) report -1.7 percent announcement returns for 
equity issues by bank holding companies (as opposed to -3 percent for 
manufacturing firms). A smaller market reaction has also been 
reported for share repurchases and dividend increases and dividend 
cuts. Thus, there is some evidence that at least larger banks are more 
transparent than nonfinancial firms.
9. The sample begins in 1992 because consistent disclosure of option 
portfolios began at that time. 
10. The direction and magnitude of the bias resulting from this 
reporting convention are discussed in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). 
They conclude that the direction of the bias is indeterminate and the 
net effect may not be severe.
11. See Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (2000) and Chance, Kumar, 
and Todd (2000) for empirical evidence of this common practice. In 
many cases, additional options are also granted. The ExecuComp data 
set that we use does not provide detailed information to distinguish 
between the resetting of existing options and the granting of new 
options. 
12. Some argue that depositors do not care much about risk when the 
FDIC insures their accounts. However, if compensation for bank 
management provides risk-shifting incentives, banks will be subject to 
more regulation and higher priced insurance premiums. For details of 
this argument, see John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000).References
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